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Abstract
We consider a ﬁrm acting strategically on behalf of its shareholders.
The price normalization problem arising in general equilibrium models of
imperfect competition can be overcome by using the concept of real wealth
maximization. This concept is based on shareholders’ aggregate demand
and does not involve any utility comparisons. We explore the eﬃciency
properties of real wealth maxima for the group of shareholders. A strategy
is called S-eﬃcient (S stands for shareholders) if there is no other strategy
such that shareholders’ new total demand can be redistributed in a way
that all shareholders will be better oﬀ. Our main result states that the
set of real wealth maximizing strategies coincides with the set of S-eﬃcient
strategies provided that shareholders’ social surplus is concave. Thus, even
if a ﬁrm does not know the preferences of its shareholders it can achieve
S-eﬃciency by selecting a real wealth maximizing strategy.
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11 Introduction
In this paper, we consider a simple model of a ﬁrm acting strategically on behalf
of its shareholders. The ﬁrm inﬂuences relative prices in the economy either by
its production decision or directly as a price setter. We assume that the ﬁrm is
owned by a large number (ideally, a continuum) of small shareholders who take
prices and wealth as given when choosing their consumption plans. The wealth of
a consumer consists of the value of his initial endowment and his proﬁt share. If a
ﬁrm is engaged in imperfect competition, the strategy choice does not only aﬀect
the wealth of its shareholders, but also the prices shareholders face as consumers
on the market. Since demand patterns and shareholdings diﬀer across individuals,
diﬀerent shareholders would like their ﬁrm to pursue diﬀerent objectives. A
similar problem is encountered in economies with incomplete markets, where
shareholders disagree because of their idiosyncratic insurance needs. Thus, in case
of imperfect competition as well as incomplete markets, a social choice problem
arises for which there is no obvious solution [see, in particular, Arrow (1983), p.
2].1
In the literature, this social choice problem is often assumed away. In the ﬁeld
of industrial organization, it is nearly always taken for granted that shareholders
only consume and own goods whose prices do not depend on the action of their
ﬁrm. Similarly, in the ﬁnance literature dealing with incomplete markets, the
ﬁrm is often assumed to neglect that the choice of its production plan inﬂuences
the insurance possibilities of its shareholders (“market value maximization”).
In many models of imperfect competition, ﬁrms are assumed to maximize prof-
its. However, it is well known from the literature that this objective is ill-deﬁned
unless particular, strong assumptions are made, see for example Gabszewicz and
Vial (1972) and H. Dierker and Grodal (1986). Since the price level remains unde-
termined, proﬁts are normalized by using one of the commodities as num´ eraire or,
more generally, by applying some price normalization rule. But diﬀerent price
normalizations entail proﬁt functions which are in general not related to each
other by monotone transformations. Hence, maximization of proﬁts in diﬀerent
normalizations amounts to ﬁrms pursuing diﬀerent objectives.
To overcome the price normalization problem, E. Dierker and Grodal (1999)
propose the concept of real wealth maximization. Given the strategies of all other
ﬁrms, the strategy ˆ  maximizes shareholders’ real wealth if it is undominated
in the following sense: There does not exist another strategy 0 such that the
aggregate demand of all shareholders at ˆ  is in the interior of their aggregate
budget set at 0.
Real wealth maximization is based on proﬁts and the composition of the ag-
gregate demand of the ﬁrm’s shareholders. Moreover, it is independent of any a
1Headnote to Arrow (1950) in Arrow (1983). We are grateful to M. Hellwig for drawing our
attention to this headnote.
2priori chosen price normalization. If real wealth maximization is applied, share-
holders’ aggregate demand endogenously yields a yardstick to compare proﬁts.
If ˆ  is a real wealth maximum and ˆ D is shareholders’ total demand at ˆ , then
shareholders’ wealth never suﬃces to buy more than ˆ D.
In an important contribution to the theory of incomplete markets, Dr` eze
(1974) deﬁnes the goal of a ﬁrm by using Pareto comparisons accompanied by
redistribution. Given the production decisions of all other ﬁrms, a production
decision of the ﬁrm under consideration leads to an allocation of goods among
its shareholders. In general, these allocations will not be Pareto comparable.
Therefore, Dr` eze proposes the following test that a production decision has to
pass: It must be impossible to choose another production plan together with a
redistribution scheme for the group of shareholders such that all shareholders
will be better oﬀ if they keep their portfolio ﬁxed. Clearly, since markets are
incomplete, the redistribution is only allowed to involve the good available to the
group of shareholders at the present date t = 0.
We will now formulate the analogue of the Dr` eze criterion for the case of im-
perfect competition. Consider a speciﬁc ﬁrm and assume that the strategies of all
other ﬁrms are given. The strategy  of the ﬁrm gives rise to a price system which,
together with the proﬁts Π(), determines the budget set of each shareholder.
Thus, each strategy  induces an allocation of goods among the shareholders of
the ﬁrm under consideration. As in the case of incomplete markets, these allo-
cations will in general not be Pareto ranked. We say that strategy 0 of a ﬁrm
dominates strategy  if the aggregate demand of the shareholders of this ﬁrm at
0 can be redistributed in such a way that every shareholder will be better oﬀ.
In analogy to the Dr` eze criterion, we propose the following test that a strategy ¯ 
has to pass: There is no strategy 0 that dominates ¯ . An undominated strategy
is called S-eﬃcient (S stands for shareholders).
It is important to clarify the role redistribution plays in our setting. We
want to emphasize that no redistribution ever takes place among the sharehold-
ers.2 Redistribution only enters in the form of the following thought experiment.
Suppose there is an omniscient hypothetical planner who can freely redistribute
goods among shareholders. If the ﬁrm chooses a certain strategy , the hypo-
thetical planner checks whether there exists another strategy 0 such that he
can achieve a Pareto improvement for the shareholders by redistributing their
aggregate demand at 0 among them. If he can, the strategy  is discarded. If
he cannot,  can be implemented. Clearly, to implement  the planner is not
needed. Therefore, the assumption of an omniscient planner who possesses the
power to perform any lump sum redistribution presents no restriction here since
2This point has caused a certain confusion in the literature on general equilibrium theory
with incomplete markets. In our view, the usual deﬁnition of the set of feasible allocations
is inappropriate since redistribution at time t = 0 is allowed to take place in the traditional
deﬁnition of a feasible allocation.
3it is used only to single out certain allocations, which can be obtained without
any help of a planner.3
The Dr` eze criterion is based on Pareto comparisons and cannot be stated
without reference to preferences. To make Pareto comparisons the ﬁrm is sup-
posed to know the distribution of shareholders’ preferences. By contrast, a ﬁrm
maximizing shareholders’ real wealth only needs to know their aggregate demand
function. Obviously, these informational requirements are much less demanding,
and the question arises as to how both concepts are related to each other.
In order to analyze how real wealth maxima and S-eﬃcient allocations are
related, a particular type of imperfect competition must be stipulated. We opt for
a framework in which ﬁrms set prices and we study the behavior of a ﬁrm under
the assumption that the prices of its competitors are given. For this purpose,
it suﬃces to focus on an economy with two commodities and a price setting
monopolist who produces good 1 using good 0, the num´ eraire, as input. The
strategy P of the ﬁrm is the decision to oﬀer one unit of the product in exchange
for P units of the num´ eraire.
We will show that any S-eﬃcient strategy maximizes shareholders’ real wealth
if the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is concave. Since real wealth maximization is deﬁned
without reference to utility functions, the more interesting question is whether a
real wealth maximizing strategy is S-eﬃcient.
To address this question, we ﬁrst assume that shareholders have quasilin-
ear preferences. In this case, shareholders’ preferences can be aggregated into
a single preference relation, for which shareholders’ social surplus is a utility
representation. Therefore, S-eﬃciency amounts to maximizing the utility of the
representative owner, that is to surplus maximization. Moreover, a surplus max-
imizing strategy maximizes real wealth [cf. Section 5]. Thus, if there is a unique
real wealth maximizing strategy it must be S-eﬃcient.
In order to formulate conditions ensuring a unique real wealth maximum, we
introduce the notion of a shareholder’s marginal willingness to pay for an increase
of the strategy P. The sum of these marginal willingnesses vanishes if and only
if real wealth is maximized. Thus, if the sum of the marginal willingnesses is
strictly decreasing, there is only one real wealth maximum. It turns out that
this monotonicity property is equivalent to the strict concavity of the surplus
function. Hence, if shareholders’ utilities are quasilinear, strict concavity of the
surplus function implies that real wealth maximization entails a unique outcome,
which is S-eﬃcient.
If we give up the quasilinear framework, some of these statements carry over
and others are lost or need to be modiﬁed. In the quasilinear setting, the existence
3Dr` eze’s characterization of the objective of a ﬁrm is intimately related to Shapley’s exten-
sion of the value to NTU games. In both cases, the solution concept involves a tool that is not
available to the agents. This hypothetical tool is used to formulate the following postulate: The
outcome should be such that no improvement would be possible even if the tool were available.
4of an S-eﬃcient outcome is obvious. However, S-eﬃciency may be unobtainable
in more general cases. We present an example in which there are several real
wealth maxima, but all of them dominated. The nonexistence of an S-eﬃcient
outcome relies on the fact that the wealth of a shareholder is given by a ﬁxed
assignment of initial endowments and proﬁt shares. Thus, nonexistence is due to
a conﬂict between eﬃciency and distribution. The incompatibility of eﬃciency
with a given distribution has been discovered by Guesnerie (1975) in the context
of nonconvex production sets.
A natural way to ensure existence of S-eﬃcient outcomes and the S-eﬃciency
of real wealth maxima is to generalize the insight obtained from the quasilinear
case. Let ˆ P maximize real wealth and deﬁne shareholders’ compensated social
surplus associated with ˆ P as the diﬀerence between the aggregate wealth they
obtain at some strategy P and the expenditures needed to keep them on the
utility levels they have at ˆ P. If this social surplus function is concave, then
ˆ P is S-eﬃcient. To obtain uniqueness of a real wealth maximum we use strict
concavity of shareholders’ uncompensated surplus function.
Therefore, concavity of surplus functions plays a crucial role in the quasilinear
as well as the general case. Hence, we show the invariance of this property with
respect to the choice of economically meaningful linear structures on strategies
and on wealth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3
and Section 4, real wealth maximization and S-eﬃciency are deﬁned, respectively.
In Section 5, we analyze the connection between social surplus maximization,
real wealth maximization, and S-eﬃciency in the quasilinear setting. Section
6 is devoted to the invariance of the concavity of the proﬁt and the surplus
functions with respect to meaningful normalization rules. Section 7 presents the
example. In Section 8, it is shown that real wealth maximization and S-eﬃciency
are identical goals if shareholders’ compensated social surplus is concave. Section
9 concludes the paper.
2 Model and Basic Notation
It suﬃces to consider an economy with two commodities and one price setting
monopolist who produces good 1 using good 0, the num´ eraire, as input. The anal-
ysis will be essentially the same as that of a price setting ﬁrm in an oligopolistic
market if the prices of its competitors are given. For simplicity’s sake, we assume
that the ﬁrm has ﬁxed unit costs c > 0. The strategy P is the commitment
to deliver one unit of the product in exchange for P units of the num´ eraire. If
commodity 0 serves as num´ eraire, we use the subscript N. For instance, proﬁts
obtained at prices (1;P) are denoted ΠN(P).
5The consumers are denoted by I = f1; ;mg. Consumer i 2 I has shares
#i  0 in the ﬁrm. We assume that the ﬁrm has a large set I = fi 2 I j #i > 0g
of shareholders and that all consumers, owners as well as nonowners, take their
budget sets as given. Suppose, for simplicity’s sake, that the consumption set of
every consumer equals R2
+ and that no consumer has initial endowments of the
product, that is, consumer i has the initial endowment ei = (ei
0;0) where ei
0 > 0.
Since Pareto comparisons are made, we assume that every consumer i has a C1
demand function di that is generated by a strictly convex, monotone preference
relation i, which can be represented by the C2 utility function Ui. Moreover,
whenever convenient, expenditure functions are assumed to be C2 in prices. The
demand function di is homogeneous of degree 0 and satisﬁes the budget identity
(1;P)di(1;P;W i
N) = W i
N. The wealth of consumer i at prices (1;P) is described
by the function W i
N(P) = ei




aggregate wealth of the shareholders.
We assume throughout that proﬁt expectations are correct, that is, the de-
mand based on consumers’ wealth expectations generates precisely the expected
proﬁts if the monopolist satisﬁes the demand for its product. That is to say, prof-




N(P)) is the total
demand of all consumers for good 1 if prices are (1;P) and proﬁts are ΠN(P). We
assume that ΠN is a continuous function. Let Di(P) = di(1;P; W i
N(P)) denote
shareholder i’s demand corresponding to strategy P. Shareholders’ aggregate
demand is D(P) =
P
i2I Di(P). Let Pmax be the smallest P at which ΠN attains
its maximum. Clearly, no shareholder wishes the ﬁrm to charge a price above
Pmax. Therefore, we consider only strategies in P = [c;Pmax]. We assume that
WN(P) > 0 for all P 2 P. Moreover, the demand of the nonowners for the ﬁrm’s
product is supposed to be positive if P = c.
Since we only analyze commodity assignments to the group I of shareholders,
we call such assignments allocations for short. For every strategy P 2 P, there
exists exactly one allocation, namely the allocation (Di(P))i2I. An allocation is
attainable iﬀ it can be implemented by a strategy choice of the ﬁrm.
Deﬁnition . The allocation (xi)i2I is attainable iﬀ there exists P 2 P such that
xi = Di(P) for all i 2 I.
Observe that no sidepayments occur in the deﬁnition of an attainable alloca-
tion. As we have already mentioned, all agents, shareholders as well as nonshare-
holders, buy the ﬁrm’s product at market prices. Thus, consumers are treated as
anonymous. Nobody knows which characteristics any other, particular consumer
possesses. This fact is in accordance with the Walrasian tradition. Walras equi-
libria depend only on the distribution of agents’ characteristics. In the present
framework no additional information is assumed. Therefore, sidepayments cannot
be made.
63 Real Wealth Maximization
Each strategy P deﬁnes the budget line
BL(P) = f(x0;x1) 2 R
2 j x0 + Px1 = WN(P)g (1)
and the corresponding budget set
AB(P) = f(x0;x1) 2 R
2
+ j (1;P)(x0;x1)  WN(P)g
of the group of owners. Their aggregate budget set is AB =
S
P2P AB(P). Note
that AB is compact since P is compact and WN is continuous. Since R2
+nAB(P)








, the aggregate budget
set is the complement of a convex set. The North-East boundary of AB is called
the aggregate budget curve ABC. More precisely,
ABC = fx 2 AB j @z  0 such that x + z 2 ABg:
We deﬁne the objective of the monopolist without making a priori assumptions
on the demand behavior of the shareholders. Consider two diﬀerent strategies
P1;P2 and the corresponding aggregate budget sets AB(P1) and AB(P2). First,
we look at the extreme case, in which AB(P1) is strictly contained in AB(P2).
Let x  0;x 6= 0, be any commodity bundle. Clearly, the number of units of
the bundle x which the shareholders can aﬀord if the ﬁrm chooses strategy P2 is
strictly larger than the number of units they can buy if the ﬁrm chooses strategy
P1. Whatever bundle the ﬁrm uses to evaluate the real wealth of the shareholders,
their aggregate wealth is larger at P2 than at P1. We assume that a real wealth
maximizing ﬁrm choosing between P1 and P2 will select P2, although it may very
well be that some shareholders, due to distributional eﬀects, prefer strategy P1
to P2.
In general, the budget sets corresponding to diﬀerent strategies of the ﬁrm
will not be ordered by inclusion. Hence the ordering of budget sets according to
the number of units of the bundle x which can be bought out of shareholders’
aggregate wealth depends on the choice of the reference bundle x. However,
when the ﬁrm considers a strategy P, it is assumed to know the composition
x(P) = D(P)=kD(P)k of shareholders’ aggregate demand at P. In our opinion,
it is natural for the ﬁrm to use x(P) as the reference bundle.
Note that, in general, shareholders do not agree on the strategy choice of their
ﬁrm. Shareholder i wants the ﬁrm to maximize Ui(Di(P)). Since shareholders
diﬀer with regard to shares, endowments, and preferences, they want the ﬁrm to
pursue diﬀerent goals. As a consequence, there will typically be a continuum of
strategies that cannot be Pareto ranked. Pareto comparisons of attainable states
cannot provide us with a useful deﬁnition of the goal of the ﬁrm.
The same holds true for proﬁt maximization unless very strong assumptions
are made. The maximization of proﬁts ΠN measured in terms of the num´ eraire
7is justiﬁed only if shareholders do neither own nor consume the ﬁrm’s product.
Moreover, diﬀerent ways to normalize prices and measure proﬁts lead to diﬀerent
proﬁt functions and hence diﬀerent maxima. If there is no clear, a priori spec-
iﬁed connection between some commodity basket used to deﬁne proﬁts and the
shareholders’ desires, the maximization of a proﬁt function cannot be used as
an objective of the ﬁrm acting on behalf of its shareholders. In E. Dierker and
Grodal (1999), the following relation is used to introduce an objective of the ﬁrm:
Deﬁnition . Shareholders’ real wealth at P1 2 P can be increased by strategy
P2 2 P, in symbols P1 rw P2, iﬀ (1;P2)D(P1) < WN(P2).
The objective of the ﬁrm is to choose a strategy ˆ P such that there is no other
strategy P which increases shareholders’ real wealth. That is to say, there is no
other strategy P such that the aggregate demand D( ˆ P) lies below the budget
line BL(P). If such a strategy P existed, the group of shareholders could buy
more units of the bundle D( ˆ P) if the ﬁrm chose strategy P instead of ˆ P.
Deﬁnition . Strategy ˆ P 2 P maximizes shareholders’ real wealth if there is no
strategy P 2 P such that (1;P)D( ˆ P) < WN(P), that is to say, if D( ˆ P) 2 ABC.
Strategies maximizing shareholders’ real wealth need not exist since the rela-
tion rw need neither be acyclic nor convex. In E. Dierker and Grodal (1998),
conditions on the aggregate demand function are given which imply that rw is
acyclic. Also, they show that convexity of rw obtains if the proﬁt function is
concave. In either case, a real wealth maximum exists.
Observe that real wealth maximization reduces to proﬁt maximization in case
of perfect competition with complete markets. Moreover, it generalizes the stan-
dard approach in industrial organization, in which it is (implicitly) assumed that
shareholders only own and consume the num´ eraire commodity.
The ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximization states that sharehold-
ers’ marginal wealth equals their aggregate demand for the product.4 Since we
assume the value of the initial endowment, which takes the form (ei
0;0), to be
independent of P, we know that marginal wealth equals marginal proﬁts.
Remark 1. If ΠN is C1 and ˆ P maximizes shareholders’ real wealth, then
W
0
N( ˆ P) = Π
0
N( ˆ P) = D1( ˆ P) :
In the remainder of this section, we present two alternative characterizations
of the ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximization. The ﬁrst will be used to
establish the uniqueness of a real wealth maximum and is based on the concept







4For a proof, see E. Dierker and Grodal (1998).
8Agent i obtains the utility ui(P;) if the relative price P is chosen and if i gets
 units of the bundle (1;0) as sidepayment. His marginal willingness to pay for






Remark 2. Let ¯ P 2 intP. Then ¯ P satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition for real
wealth maximization iﬀ
P
i2I MW i( ¯ P) = 0.
Proof. By diﬀerentiation of ui we obtain
@Pu
























N(P)  D1(P) = W
0
N(P)  D1(P):
Then ¯ P satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximization if and only
if
P
i2I MW i( ¯ P) = 0.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the ﬁrst order condition for real wealth
maximization characterizes the envelope of the family of aggregate budget lines.
To each strategy P 2 P there corresponds the budget line
LP = f(x0;x1;P) 2 R
2  P j (1;P)  (x0;x1)  WN(P) = 0g:
The diﬀerence between LP and BL(P) as deﬁned in (1) is that LP is embedded in
R2  P, whereas BL(P)  R2. The 1-parameter family of budget lines fLPgP2P
forms a smooth 2-dimensional manifold denoted L since the derivative of the
mapping (x0;x1;P) 7! x0 + Px1  WN(P) does not vanish. Now, project L to
the commodity space R2. The envelope of the family of budget lines is deﬁned
as the set of critical values of the projection of L into the commodity space R2.
It is characterized by the condition @P(x0 + Px1  WN(P)) = 0, that is to say
W 0
N(P) = x1, together with the budget equation. Thus, the envelope is given by
Env = f(x0;x1) 2 R
2 j 9P 2 P with x0 + Px1 = WN(P) and W
0
N(P) = x1g:
Remark 3. Strategy ¯ P 2 P satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition W 0
N( ¯ P) = Π0
N( ¯ P) =
D1( ¯ P) for real wealth maximization iﬀ D( ¯ P) lies in Env.
94 S-Eﬃciency
S-eﬃciency refers to Pareto comparisons among the shareholders of a ﬁrm. The
ﬁrm wants to extract wealth from the nonowners. However, if the ﬁrm raises its
price for that purpose, then the shareholders themselves also have to pay more
since they must buy the ﬁrm’s product at market prices.
If the ﬁrm chooses P, then the group of shareholder obtains the proﬁt ΠN(P)
as well as the commodity bundle D(P). Note that the way the proﬁt is raised
cannot be separated from the way it is spent since the choice of strategy P
determines both the proﬁt income and the consumption of every shareholder.
The deﬁnition of S-eﬃciency must take this link into account.
The concept of S-eﬃciency is based on the following thought experiment:
Suppose ¯ P has been chosen and is compared with the alternative P. Clearly, if
P is implemented, the group of shareholders receives the bundle D(P), and the
proﬁt ΠN(P) contains the part (Pc)D1(P) derived from this bundle. In order to
keep this relation intact, D(P) is kept ﬁxed in the thought experiment. Assume
that the group of shareholders could, after having obtained D(P), redistribute
this bundle in order to compensate the losers of the move from ¯ P to P. They
would then certainly not move from the original strategy ¯ P to the alternative
P if they could not even obtain a Pareto improvement for themselves in this
hypothetical situation.
We are now going to deﬁne S-eﬃciency in a more formal way.
Deﬁnition . The strategy P1 2 P is dominated by the strategy P2 2 P iﬀ there
exist bundles (xi)i2I such that
P
i2I xi = D(P2) and Di(P1) i xi for all i 2 I.
A strategy ¯ P is undominated if there is no P 2 P such that D(P) can be
distributed among the shareholders in a way which leaves them better oﬀ than
at ¯ P. An undominated strategy ¯ P and the corresponding allocation (Di( ¯ P))i2I
are called S-eﬃcient.
Deﬁnition . The strategy ¯ P and the corresponding allocation (Di( ¯ P))i2I are S-
eﬃcient iﬀ there does not exist a strategy P 2 P dominating ¯ P.
We derive the ﬁrst order condition for S-eﬃciency.
Proposition 1. Let the proﬁt function ΠN be C1 and assume that the allocation
(Di( ¯ P))i2I is S-eﬃcient. Then strategy ¯ P satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition




1( ¯ P)) = 0:
This condition is equivalent to the ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximiza-
tion, i.e. D1( ¯ P) = W 0
N( ¯ P).
10Proof. Since ΠN is C1, shareholders’ aggregate demand D is C1. Let ¯ P 2 P
and assume that the allocation (Di( ¯ P))i2I is S-eﬃcient. Assume by way of
contradiction that (1; ¯ P)  (D0
0( ¯ P);D0
1( ¯ P)) 6= 0. Without loss of generality let
(1; ¯ P)  (D0
0( ¯ P);D0
1( ¯ P)) > 0. (If this expression is negative, consider strategies
P < ¯ P.) Then (1; ¯ P)(D(P)D( ¯ P)) > 0 for P > ¯ P and jP  ¯ Pj suﬃciently small.
Since all preferences are strictly convex and the utility functions are C2, there ex-
ists " > 0 such that for any shareholder i the following condition holds. If u 2 R2,
kuk < ", (1; ¯ P)u > 0, and Di( ¯ P)+u 2 R2
+, then Di( ¯ P)+u i Di( ¯ P) [see, e.g.,
Magill and Quinzii (1996), p. 359]. Since D is continuous, there exists  > 0 such
that kD(P)  D( ¯ P)k <  for jP  ¯ Pj < . Now let ui = #i(D(P)  D( ¯ P)). For
jP  ¯ Pj suﬃciently small we obtain Di( ¯ P) + #i(D(P)  D( ¯ P)) i Di( ¯ P) for all
shareholders i. However, as
P
i2I(Di( ¯ P) + #i(D(P)  D( ¯ P))) = D(P), this con-
tradicts the fact that (Di( ¯ P))i2I is S-eﬃcient. Hence, (1; ¯ P)(D0
0( ¯ P);D0
1( ¯ P)) = 0.
To ascertain that the ﬁrst order condition for S-eﬃciency coincides with the
ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximization, we diﬀerentiate the budget
equation (1;P)  D(P) = WN(P) and obtain (1;P)  (D0
0(P);D0
1(P)) + D1(P) =
W 0
N(P). Hence, (1;P)  (D0
0(P);D0
1(P)) = 0 iﬀ D1(P) = W 0
N(P).
On the assumption that the proﬁt function ΠN is concave, E. Dierker and Gro-
dal (1998), Theorem 3, show that a real wealth maximum obtains whenever the
ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximization is satisﬁed. Thus, Proposition
1 implies the following:
Proposition 2. Let D and ΠN be C1 and ΠN concave. Assume that the strategy
ˆ P is S-eﬃcient. Then strategy ˆ P maximizes shareholders’ real wealth.
5 S-Eﬃciency and Uniqueness of Real Wealth
Maxima: The Quasilinear Case
To explore under which conditions the converse of Proposition 2 holds, it is in-
structive to investigate the case in which all shareholders have quasilinear utility
functions Ui. This setting has the following major advantage: Although share-
holders may diﬀer radically in their individual assessments of the strategy of their
ﬁrm, their preferences can be aggregated into a single one for the following reason.
Consider any two utility proﬁles of the shareholders and add their individually
preferred sets. Then one of the aggregate preferred sets must be contained in the
other. In other words, Scitovsky curves do not intersect each other due to the
absence of income eﬀects that aﬀect the demand for the product. Therefore, the
Scitovsky curves describe the preferences of a single consumer. Let URep denote
a utility function of this consumer. Let S1 and S2 be two aggregate preferred
sets corresponding to the utility levels U1 and U2, respectively. Then U2 > U1
11iﬀ S2  intS1.5 Clearly, if income eﬀects are permitted, additional phenomena
enter the picture. They will be analyzed in the following sections.
For the maximization of the utility of the representative owner, there is a
clear economic interpretation. Since shareholders have quasilinear utilities, their
consumers’ surplus is unambiguously deﬁned and their social surplus can be writ-
ten as SN(P) = ΠN(P) +
R 1
P D1(p)dp. Assume that SN(P1) < SN(P2) and let
U1 and U2 be the associated utility levels, respectively. Let E
Rep
N denote the
expenditure function of the representative owner. Then ΠN(P1) < ΠN(P2) + R P1
P2 D1(p)dp = ΠN(P2) + (E
Rep
N (P1;U2)  E
Rep
N (P2;U2)). Denoting shareholders’
aggregate initial endowment by (e0;0), we have e0 + ΠN(P1) = E
Rep
N (P1;U1) and
e0 + ΠN(P2) = E
Rep
N (P2;U2). As a consequence, the above inequality becomes
E
Rep






N (P2;U2)) = E
Rep
N (P1;U2), and
we conclude that U1 < U2. This argument shows that surplus maximization
amounts to maximizing the utility of the representative owner. In particular, a
surplus maximum must be undominated.
The ﬁrst order condition for surplus maximization, Π0
N(P) = D1(P), coincides
with the ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximization. Moreover, the real
wealth shareholders obtain at P1 can be increased by choice of P2, in symbols
P1 rw P2, iﬀ (1;P2)D(P1) < WN(P2). Therefore, P1 rw P2 implies U1 < U2.
Note, however, that the relation rw is not complete. It may happen that the
surplus maximum is unique, but that additional real wealth maxima exist at the
same time.
Remark 4. Assume that shareholders’ utility functions are quasilinear. Then
surplus maximization and the maximization of the representative owner’s utility
coincide. Furthermore, P1 rw P2 implies U1 < U2. In particular, a unique real
wealth maximum is a surplus maximum and, therefore, undominated.
Thus, the question arises as to the conditions entailing the uniqueness of a
real wealth maximum. Obviously, if P equals unit costs c, proﬁts vanish. Since
the demand of the nonowners is positive at P = c by assumption, an inﬁnitesimal
price increase raises shareholders’ wealth, and the sum of the marginal willing-
nesses MW i(c) is positive. Similarly, if P = Pmax, no shareholder’s marginal
willingness MW i will be positive, and every shareholder who consumes a positive
amount of the product would beneﬁt from a lower price. Thus,
P
i2I MW i(Pmax)
is negative. Naturally, a unique real wealth maximum results if one assumes that P
i2I MW i(P) is strictly decreasing in the interval P = [c;Pmax].
The present quasilinear setting provides an ideal framework for the interpreta-
tion of this monotonicity assumption. As laid out below, the marginal willingness
MW i(P) can easily be integrated with respect to P, and the result is closely con-
nected to i’s part of the social surplus.
5This refers to the interior relative to R2
+.
12Given ˜ P, let T i : P ! R describe the compensation shareholder i needs in
order to stay at the utility level ˜ Ui, that is, T i(P) is uniquely deﬁned by the
equation ui(P;T i(P)) = ˜ Ui = ui( ˜ P;0). Clearly, if P is raised inﬁnitesimally,
dT i(P)=dP has to be given to i in order to keep him at the utility level ˜ Ui.
That is to say, i’ marginal willingness is given by MW i(P) = dT i(P)=dP.
The assumption that
P
i2I MW i(P) is strictly decreasing can then be restated as
follows: The aggregate compensation T(P) =
P
i2I T i(P) needed to keep every
shareholder i on the utility level ˜ Ui is a strictly convex function of P. One can
think of T(P) as the amount of shareholders’ social surplus that can be liberated
if the ﬁrm moves from P to ˜ P. In this case, shareholder i’s part of the social
surplus increases by T i(P).
The monotonicity assumption entailing the uniqueness and S-eﬃciency of a
real wealth maximum can be rephrased as follows. We assume that ΠN is concave.
Then the domain Ci = f(P;) 2 P  R j W i
N(P) +   0g of the indirect utility
function ui is convex for every i 2 I. The aggregate preferred set associated with
the surplus maximizing strategy ˜ P, and the resulting utility proﬁle (˜ Ui)i2I is








i)  ˜ U
i for each i 2 Ig:
Note that ˜ A is the epigraph f(P;) 2 P  R j   T(P)g of the aggregate
compensation function T and that ˜ A is strictly convex iﬀ T is strictly convex.6
As argued above, this is the case iﬀ
P
i2I MW i(P) is strictly decreasing.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that the utility functions Ui of the shareholders i 2 I
are quasilinear and assume that the proﬁt function ΠN is concave. Let ˜ P de-
note a surplus maximizing strategy and (˜ Ui)i2I the associated utility proﬁle of the
shareholders. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
i) The sum
P
i2I MW i(P) of the marginal willingnesses to increase P is strictly
decreasing for P 2 P = [c;Pmax].
ii) The total compensation T =
P
i2I T i : P ! R needed to keep every share-
holder on the utility level ˜ Ui is a strictly convex function.
iii) The aggregate preferred set ˜ A  P  R is strictly convex.
Each of these conditions implies the uniqueness and S-eﬃciency of a real wealth
maximum. Moreover, maximization of real wealth and maximization of share-
holders’ social surplus coincide in this case.
6More precisely, the lower boundary of ˜ A is strictly convex, i.e., ˜ A is the intersection of a
strictly convex set with P  R.
136 Linear Structures on Strategies and Wealth
In Proposition 2 the proﬁt function ΠN is assumed to be concave. Moreover,
in Proposition 3 S-eﬃciency and uniqueness of a real wealth maximum is de-
rived from an assumption either requiring a certain convexity property directly
[see conditions ii) and iii)], or stipulating the monotonicity of
P
i2I MW i(P).
However, whenever we speak about the concavity or convexity of some set or
function, we need an underlying linear structure. In the present case, we need
linear structures on the sets of strategies and wealth, respectively.
In order to introduce such linear structures, we have expressed prices and
wealth in units of commodity 0. Instead of using a particular good as num´ eraire,
one could have taken any commodity bundle x = (x0;x1); x0 > 0. This leads to
the question of whether Propositions 2 and 3 and other statements are invariant
with respect to the choice of bundle x. In this section, we show that the concavity
of the proﬁt function, the convexity of the aggregate preferred set ˜ A, and related
items are invariant with respect to the choice of bundle x.7
Prices normalized with respect to x are denoted (0;1), that is, (0;1)
satisﬁes 0x0 + 1x1 = 1. Thus, 1 denotes the output price in terms of bundle
x and the corresponding input price is 0 = (1  1x1)=x0. If bundle x is used
to measure wealth, then Wx denotes the maximal number of units of bundle x
aﬀordable at prices (0;1).
Consider any AN  R+  R. As before, the subscript N indicates that we
use good 0 as num´ eraire. The ﬁrst component of (P;WN) 2 AN corresponds to
the price system (1;P), the second measures the wealth in terms of the bundle
(1;0). Now replace (1;0) by an alternative bundle x = (x0;x1); x0 > 0;. Then
R+  R, and hence AN, are transformed as follows:






The price system corresponding to (1;P) in the x-normalization is given by
(1=(x0 + Px1);P=(x0 + Px1)). Hence, the ﬁrst coordinate of tx(P;WN) equals
1 = P=(x0 + Px1). Moreover, the wealth WN is the number of units of the
bundle (1;0) which can be bought at the price system (1;P). At the price system
(0;1) the corresponding wealth is (WN;0)(0;1) = 0WN. The number of
units of the bundle x, given the wealth 0WN, is Wx = WN0=(0x0 + 1x1) =
WN=(x0 + Px1). Thus, the second coordinate of tx(P;WN) is WN=(x0 + Px1).
Proposition 4. If prices are normalized with respect to an arbitrary consumption
bundle x 2 R2
+ n f0g, then the set Ax = tx(AN) is convex if and only if AN is
convex.
7This follows from observations in E. Dierker and Grodal (1999). Here we shall present a
shorter and more direct argument.
14Proof. Consider any points (P;WN) and (P 0;W 0
N) in AN. An easy calculation
shows that we have, for any  2 [0;1],
tx((P;WN) + (1  )(P
0;W
0




where  = (x0 + Px1)=(x0 + (P + (1  )P 0)x1)). Note that , when consid-
ered as a function of  2 [0;1], is bijective. Hence, Ax is convex iﬀ AN is convex.
Proposition 4 entails that the concavity of the proﬁt function, the expenditure
function, or the surplus function does not depend on which commodity bundle is
used to normalize prices and measure wealth. This is due to the following fact: If
the set below the graph of one of these functions is convex if the N-normalization
is used, its image under the mapping tx is convex.
We use the proﬁt function to illustrate the invariance. Let Πx denote proﬁts
as function of the output price if bundle x has been used to normalize prices and
measure wealth. We want to show that the proﬁt function Πx is concave for any
bundle x iﬀ ΠN is concave.
With the price system (0;1), the ﬁrm obtains the proﬁt ΠN(1=0) in terms
of good 0, which corresponds to the value (0;1)(ΠN(1=0); 0). This proﬁt









where 1 lies in the range of the transformed prices with 1 < 1=x1. Hence, we
obtain tx(P;ΠN(P)) = (1;Πx(1)) for all P 2 R+. Clearly, Πx is concave if and
only if f1;r) j r  Πx(1)g is convex. Note that, in the above argument, Πx can
be replaced by the expenditure or the surplus as a function of the output price.
Remark 5. Assume that only normalization rules are used that have an economic
interpretation. That is to say, there is a commodity bundle x  0;x 6= 0, such
that px = 1 for all prices under consideration. Wealth is expressed in units of the
same bundle x. In that case, the concavity of the proﬁt, expenditure or surplus
function does not depend on the normalization rule used. As a consequence, the
results in this paper are independent of the choice of the normalization rule.
7 Nonexistence of S-Eﬃcient Strategies
In the quasilinear case, there can be several real wealth maxima. They need not
all be undominated. However, there is always at least one S-eﬃcient real wealth
maximum, namely the maximum of shareholders’ social surplus.
Now we will consider a framework in which no representative owner exists. In
our example there is no undominated attainable allocation. There are two real
wealth maxima, but each of them dominates the other.
15The example is constructed as follows: The aggregate demand function g of
all nonowners is taken as being linear. The group of owners of the ﬁrm can
“almost” be represented by one agent. In fact, there are two owners of the ﬁrm,
a large one with a CES utility function and a small one with a quasilinear utility
function. The weights are calibrated such that the two real wealth maxima yield
approximately the same utility for the large CES owner.
In the example, the proﬁt function ΠN of the ﬁrm is not concave. In order
to show that the absence of an S-eﬃcient allocation does not depend on the
nonconcavity of the proﬁt function, we also consider the concaviﬁcation ˜ ΠN of
the proﬁt function and note that the phenomenon persists.
There is one ﬁrm with constant unit costs c = 1. The demand function of the
nonowners is given by
g(1;P) = 1000  P:
There are two (types of) owners with initial endowments, e1 = (1000;0) and














The (large) CES shareholder owns the fraction 0:999 of the ﬁrm and the (small)
quasilinear shareholder the fraction 0:001.
An easy computation yields that the proﬁt function is given by
ΠN(P) = (P  1)
1000  P + 722
P2 + 2110103
P(2110+P10)
1  (P  1) 21100:999
P(2110+P10)
:




P 10(103 + 0:999  ΠN(P))
2110 + P 10 ;
2110(103 + 0:999  ΠN(P))













respectively. Shareholders’ total demand is D(P) = D1(P) + D2(P).
A calculation yields that there are three strategies which satisfy the ﬁrst order
condition Π0
N(P) = D1(P) for real wealth maximization, namely
PA  12:94; PB  500:48; PC  26:45:
However, as the proﬁt function ΠN is not concave, the ﬁrst order condition is
not suﬃcient. A direct investigation shows that the two strategies PA  12:94
16and PB  500:48 are real wealth maximizing strategies, whereas PC is not. For
instance, D(PC) lies in the interior of the budget set AB(PB) associated with PB.
The aggregate budget curve ABC has a kink since the proﬁt function does not
coincide with its concaviﬁcation ˜ ΠN [cf. E. Dierker and Grodal (1999), Section
3]. However, the proﬁt function ΠN and its concaviﬁcation ˜ ΠN coincide at PA
and PB. Thus, real wealth is also maximized at PA and PB if ˜ ΠN rather than ΠN
is used.
We want to show that the strategies PA  12:94 and PB  500:48 are dom-
inated, more precisely, that either of the real wealth maximizing strategies is
dominated by the other one. First, we calculate the utility levels of the two
owners when the ﬁrm chooses strategy PB and obtain
U
1(D
1(PB))  80840:74 and U
2(D
2(PB))  801:87:
In order to show that the strategy PA dominates strategy PB, we calculate the
aggregate demand at PA and get D(PA)  (1496:08; 11828:65): Now we let




1)  80872:80 and U
2(x
2)  801:96:
Hence, we have distributed the aggregate demand at PA such that both owners
are better oﬀ, that is, PA dominates PB.
Similarly, the utility levels at strategy PA are
U
1(D
1(PA))  80734:10 and U
2(D
2(PA))  1095:69
and the aggregate demand at strategy PB is D(PB)  (251042:23;0:021): Now
we let x2 = (1095:70;0) and x1 = D(PB)  x2 and obtain the utility levels
U
1(x
1)  80748:83 and U
2(x
2) = 1095:70:
We see that the strategy PB dominates PA. Thus, in the example, none of the
real wealth maximizing strategies leads to an S-eﬃcient allocation. Moreover,
each of the two real wealth maximizing strategies dominates the other.
Remark 6. In the example, no attainable allocation is S-eﬃcient.
Proof. According to Proposition 1, the ﬁrst order condition Π0
N(P) = D1(P) for
real wealth maximization holds at any S-eﬃcient allocation. The only strategies
satisfying this condition are PA;PB; and PC. Since PA dominates PB and vice
versa, the only remaining candidate is PC. However, the utility levels obtained at
PC are U1(D1(PC))  11282:17 and U2(D2(PC))  765:40: Both owners prefer
the bundles they obtain at PA and at PB. Thus, the strategy PC is dominated
by PA and by PB.
17One could conjecture that the nonexistence of S-eﬃcient allocations is due to
the fact that the proﬁt function is not concave. We will show that this conjecture
is false.
Consider the concaviﬁcation ˜ ΠN of the proﬁt function and deﬁne the demand
function ˜ g for the nonowners in such a way that ˜ g generates the proﬁt function
˜ ΠN, i.e. ˜ g(P) = (˜ ΠN (P 1) ˜ D1(P))=(P 1), where ˜ D1 is the aggregate demand
of the shareholders when they obtain proﬁt ˜ ΠN. It turns out that ˜ ΠN is obtained
by replacing the graph of ΠN by a straight line in the interval given approximately
by [13:96;397:14]. Outside of this interval ˜ ΠN coincides with ΠN.
First, note that PA lies to the left of the interval and PB lies to the right. PA
and PB are real wealth maximizing strategies in the economy with the concaviﬁed
proﬁt function ˜ ΠN. As before, PA dominates PB and vice versa. Second, if ΠN is
replaced by its concaviﬁcation ˜ ΠN, then PC is turned into a real wealth maximum.
We know that PC satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximization
without maximizing real wealth. Thus, according to Remark 3, D(PC) lies in
Env, but not in ABC. Clearly, shareholders’ aggregate demand function D also
changes if the proﬁt function is concaviﬁed, and the critical point PC moves to
the nearby point ˜ PC  29:19, which lies on the envelope after concaviﬁcation.
Since ˜ ΠN is concave, ˜ PC must maximize real wealth [see the end of Section 4].
Since ˜ Π is linear (i.e. barely concave) on a segment around ˜ PC, it is not
surprising that ˜ PC is dominated by points very close to ˜ PC. Here we suppress
these calculations and show that, more interestingly, ˜ PC is dominated by both




1( ˜ PC))  55116:89 and U
2( ˜ D
2( ˜ PC))  882:36:
In order to show that PA dominates ˜ PC, we distribute the aggregate demand
˜ D(PA) = D(PA)  (1496:08; 11828:65) as follows: We put x2 = (0;40) and x1 =
D(PA)  x2 and obtain the utility levels
U
1(x
1)  80817:34 and U
2(x
2)  910:74:
Hence, we have distributed the aggregate demand at PA such that both owners
are better oﬀ than they were at PA, that is, PA dominates ˜ PC.
Similarly, to show that PB dominates ˜ PC, we distribute the aggregate de-
mand ˜ D(PB) = D(PB)  (251042:23; 0:021) in the following way: We put
x2 = (1000;0) and x1 = D(PA)  x2 and get utility levels
U
1(x
1)  80776:92 and U
2(x
2) = 1000:
In the concaviﬁed economy, the proﬁt function is, of course, not strictly con-
cave. However, by continuity we can easily obtain the same conclusions in an
economy with a strictly concave proﬁt function.
Proposition 5. There are robust examples with concave proﬁt functions in which
every real wealth maximum is dominated by another real wealth maximum. As a
consequence, no S-eﬃcient strategy exists.
188 The Equivalence of Real Wealth Maximiza-
tion and S-Eﬃciency
The analysis of the representative agent model in Section 5 provides an insight
that is absent from the traditional models of general equilibrium theory and in-
dustrial organization. Clearly, the particular structure of representative consumer
models also presents a risk. In his paper “On the “Law of Demand””, Werner
Hildenbrand (1983), p. 998, points out: “There is a qualitative diﬀerence in mar-
ket and individual demand functions. This observation shows that the concept of
a “representative consumer,” which is often used in the literature, does not really
simplify the analysis; on the contrary, it might be misleading.” Representative
consumer models have often been misused. However, we are going to argue that,
with a suﬃcient degree of precaution, the study of representative agent models
helps improve general equilibrium theory with imperfect competition.
To illustrate this point, we come back to the discussion of Proposition 3 in
terms of surplus maximization or, alternatively, in terms of the utility of the
representative owner. There, shareholders’ social surplus takes the form







1(p)dp = ΠN(P)  E
Rep
N (P) + const; (2)
that is, it encompasses not only the proﬁts accruing to the representative owner
but also his expenditures E
Rep
N (which are independent of the utility level in the
present case). By contrast, in the usual G.E.- or I.O.-models, expenditures do
not appear in the deﬁnition of the goal of a ﬁrm. Indeed, the models present
special cases in which consumers’ surplus vanishes. Clearly, if it vanishes, it can
be neglected, but the price normalization problem has arisen because it has been
ignored that consumers’ surplus vanishes in degenerate cases only.
If the goal of the ﬁrm is based on shareholders’ social surplus rather than on
proﬁts, it is natural to impose the concavity assumption on SN(P) rather than on
the proﬁt function ΠN(P).8 Clearly, SN can be concave only if ΠN is concave since
the expenditure function E
Rep
N is concave in P. Remember that i’s compensation
function T i is implicitly deﬁned by ui(P;T i(P)) = ˜ Ui = ui( ˜ P;0), where the tilde
indicates the surplus maximum. Thus, if i possesses W i
N(P)+T i(P), he can just
reach ˜ Ui. Therefore, the aggregate compensation T(P) =
P
i2I T i(P) is given
by e0 + ΠN(P) + T(P) = E
Rep
N (P). Choosing the const in (2) to equal e0, we
obtain SN(P) = T(P) and SN( ˜ P) = 0. Hence, the aggregate compensation
8As pointed out in Section 5, SN is a utility function of the representative owner and indi-
vidual utility functions are ordinal concepts. However, the concavity of SN plays an important
role in the present context. The representative owner diﬀers from an ordinary consumer in the
following sense: It is often appropriate to break down his utility function into a sum of such
functions. Here they consist of the proﬁt shares and the consumer’s surpluses the individual
shareholders obtain [cf. (2)].
19function always equals T(P) = SN( ˜ P)  SN(P). Obviously, T is strictly convex
iﬀ the social surplus SN is strictly concave. Therefore, Proposition 3 can also be
interpreted as follows:
Remark 7. In the quasilinear setting S-eﬃciency and uniqueness of a real wealth
maximum obtain if shareholders’ social surplus SN is a strictly concave function
of the strategy P.
If one leaves the quasilinear framework, the situation becomes more complex.
First, the conditions for S-eﬃciency and uniqueness of a real wealth maximum no
longer coincide (see below). Second, according to Remark 6, S-eﬃcient strategies
may not exist. However, it will turn out that the concavity of an appropriately
deﬁned social surplus function yields S-eﬃciency of a real wealth maximizing
strategy. Hence S-eﬃcient strategies exist.
Now we focus on the relationship between real wealth maximization and S-
eﬃciency. In the light of surplus theory, one is led to proceed as follows [see
Luenberger (1995), chapter 6, sections 7 and 8]: Consider any strategy ˇ P, and let
ˇ U = (ˇ Ui)i2I be the associated utility proﬁle of the shareholders. Given ˇ P, deﬁne
shareholders’ compensated social surplus as








N(P; ˇ Ui) denotes i’s expenditures in terms of the input good 0. We say
that ˇ P maximizes social surplus if ˇ P maximizes SN(; ˇ U).
Let ˆ P be any real wealth maximizing strategy and SN(; ˆ U) the associated
social surplus function. The argument for S-eﬃciency of ˆ P relies on the inequality
SN(; ˆ U) = WN() 
P
i2I Ei
N(; ˆ Ui)  SN( ˆ P; ˆ U) = 0, which follows from the
concavity of SN(; ˆ U).
Theorem . Assume that ΠN is C1. Consider any strategy ˆ P 2 P and let
ˆ Ui = Ui(Di( ˆ P)) and ˆ U = (ˆ Ui)i2I. Assume that shareholders’ compensated social
surplus SN(; ˆ U) is concave. Then ˆ P is S-eﬃcient if and only if ˆ P maximizes
shareholders’ real wealth.
Proof. Since SN(; ˆ U) is concave, ΠN is concave and Proposition 2 applies. Thus,
it suﬃces to prove that ˆ P is S-eﬃcient if it satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition for real




N( ˆ P; ˆ Ui) =
D1( ˆ P) 
P
i2I hi
1( ˆ P; ˆ Ui) = 0, where hi
1 denotes shareholder i’s Hicksian demand
for good 1. Hence, the concave function SN(; ˆ U) attains its maximum at ˆ P.
Hence, SN(P; ˆ U)  SN( ˆ P; ˆ U) for all P 2 P.
Now let V = fx 2 R2
+ j x =
P
i2I xi; Ui(xi) > ˆ Ui for all i 2 Ig and consider
any x 2 V . For all P 2 P we have (1;P)x 
P
i2I Ei
N(P; ˆ Ui)  WN(P): Indeed,
(1;P)x > WN(P) for all P 2 P since preferences are monotone and continuous.
20Hence, x = 2 AB(P) for all P 2 P and, consequently, x = 2 AB. Therefore, V \AB =
;. Since D(P) 2 AB for all P 2 P, we obtain D(P) = 2 V for all P 2 P. Hence,
ˆ P is S-eﬃcient.
Remark 8.
1) Under the assumptions of the Theorem, real wealth maximization and S-
eﬃciency both coincide with compensated surplus maximization.
2) S-eﬃciency of a real wealth maximum obtains also under the weaker condition
that SN(; ˆ U) has a unique maximizer and a positive (negative) derivative to
the left (right) of the maximizer.
The latter condition coincides with strict pseudoconcavity. However, pseu-
doconcavity is not invariant with respect to the choice of the bundle used to
normalize prices. In the Theorem, concavity of SN(; ˆ U) is assumed in order to
employ an invariant assumption yielding the full equivalence of the solution con-
cepts. An S-eﬃcient strategy maximizes real wealth under the weaker assumption
that ΠN is concave.
Remember that strategy ˆ P is S-eﬃcient if there is no strategy P such that
shareholders’ aggregate demand D(P) can be redistributed in a way that all
shareholders will be better oﬀ. The proof of the Theorem shows the following
stronger property of the real wealth maximizing strategy: There is no other
strategy such that shareholders’ new wealth can be redistributed in a way that
all shareholders can buy a preferred bundle on the market.
The Theorem is based on the assumption that shareholders’ compensated
social surplus SN(; ˆ U) is concave. As in the quasilinear case, concavity of SN(; ˆ U)
is equivalent to convexity of the aggregate preferred set ˆ A corresponding to ˆ U
and equivalent to convexity of the sum of the compensation functions T i(; ˆ Ui) :
P ! R deﬁned by the condition ui(P;T i(P; ˆ Ui)) = ˆ Ui = ui( ˆ P;0).
In the quasilinear case, strict concavity of shareholders’ social surplus implies
uniqueness and S-eﬃciency of a real wealth maximum. Clearly, strict concavity
of SN(; ˆ U) does not imply uniqueness if income eﬀects are permitted. Therefore,
we consider shareholders’ uncompensated surplus
S
unc




Remark 9. If Sunc
N is strictly concave and C1, the real wealth maximum is
uniquely determined.
Remark 9 obtains since dSunc
N (P)=dP =
P
i2I MW i(P) is strictly decreasing
and any real wealth maximum ˆ P has to satisfy
P
i2I MW i( ˆ P) = 0 [cf. Remark
2]. Note that the conclusion also obtains under the weaker assumption of strict
pseudoconcavity.
21There is no clear connection between concavity of the compensated surplus
function SN(; ˆ U) used in the Theorem and concavity of the uncompensated sur-
plus function Sunc
N . By diﬀerentiation it is easily seen that for any P and corre-
sponding utility proﬁle UP = (Ui(Di(P)))i2I we have
@2
@P2Sunc
N (P) = @2










In the absence of income eﬀects term (4) vanishes. However, in general it can
have any sign.
9 Conclusion
The price normalization problem arising in general equilibrium models of imper-
fect competition can be overcome in two diﬀerent ways. First, the objective of a
ﬁrm can be described as maximization of shareholders’ real wealth. This concept
is based on the aggregate demand of the shareholders and does not rely on utility
considerations. Second, in the spirit of Dr` eze’s concept of the goal of a perfectly
competitive ﬁrm in a setting with incomplete markets, we say that strategy P1
of a ﬁrm is dominated by P2 if shareholders’ total demand D(P2) can be redis-
tributed in such a way that all shareholders will be better oﬀ than at P1. An
undominated strategy is called S-eﬃcient. In this paper, we have investigated the
relationship between the two goals, real wealth maximization and S-eﬃciency.
First, we observe that the ﬁrst order conditions for the two objectives coincide.
Second, if the proﬁt function is concave, an S-eﬃcient strategy maximizes real
wealth since the ﬁrst order condition is suﬃcient for real wealth maximization.
S-eﬃciency of real wealth maxima is ﬁrst explored in the setting of quasilinear
preferences. In this case, shareholders’ social surplus is unambiguously deﬁned.
We show that strict concavity of the social surplus function entails the coincidence
of both solution concepts. Moreover, they coincide with surplus maximization.
Furthermore, strict concavity of the surplus function implies uniqueness.
The quasilinear case exhibits properties that do not carry over smoothly to the
general case. If utilities are quasilinear, there always exists an S-eﬃcient strategy.
By means of an example, we show that there are economies without quasilinear
preferences in which each real wealth maximum is dominated by another and no
S-eﬃcient outcome exists.
In the general case, shareholders’ social surplus also plays a decisive role.
Since there are various nonequivalent versions of the notion of consumer’s sur-
plus we point out how we proceed. Each real wealth maximum determines a
reference utility proﬁle ˆ U. Compensated social surplus SN(; ˆ U) is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between the wealth generated and the wealth shareholders need
to retain their respective utility levels. Our central result can be summarized
as follows: If shareholders’ compensated social surplus is concave for every real
22wealth maximum, both solution concepts coincide. Moreover, if SN(; ˆ U) and,
hence, ΠN are concave the existence of undominated strategies can be shown.
In the quasilinear case, strict concavity of the social surplus function implies
uniqueness of a real wealth maximum. Clearly, the surplus function SN(; ˆ U) is a
welfare oriented concept based on compensated demand. Therefore, it is not an
appropriate tool to establish the uniqueness of a real wealth maximum if income
eﬀects are permitted. However, if SN(; ˆ U) is replaced by the uncompensated
surplus function Sunc
N (P) = ΠN(P) +
R 1
P D1(p)dp, strict (pseudo)concavity of
this surplus function implies that there cannot be multiple real wealth maxima.
Our arguments rely on concavity of the social surplus function. Since the
price normalization problem is due to a missing invariance property of the proﬁt
function, we show that our results are independent of which commodity bundle
is used to normalize prices and measure wealth.
The paper shows that surplus theory provides a useful tool to unify diﬀerent
concepts of the objective of a ﬁrm acting in the interest of its shareholders.
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